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UNSUSTAINABILITY OF RAWLS’S 
DUTY OF ASSISTANCE 
MENNO R. KAMMINGA 
 
University of Groningen 




Philosophers interested in John Rawls’s international political theorizing have paid 
considerable attention to the duty of assistance as a key notion of his Law of Peoples. 
However, in focusing on contentious-theoretical and practical implications of this duty, they 
have not thoroughly examined the more immediate question of whether this duty is 
sustainable from the perspective of Rawls’s Law of Peoples itself. The thesis of the present 
article is that Rawls’s duty of assistance is internally unsustainable, as it cannot be 
adequately justified from within his Law of Peoples. A threefold argument is developed. 
First, Rawls’s own explanation of the duty of assistance within the Law of Peoples is unclear 
and confusing. Second, others’ ‘Rawlsian’ ideal-theoretical and non-ideal-theoretical attempts 
to justify the duty of assistance probably inevitably fail. Third, Rawls’s Law of Peoples leads 
to skepticism about the duty of assistance’s applicability to the non-ideal world. The article 
concludes that at most a principle of corrective justice in ideal theory combined with a right 
of assistance and an ad hoc duty of corrective justice in non-ideal theory is maintainable 
within the Law of Peoples. 
 
KEYWORDS 
Duty of assistance, global justice, John Rawls, law of peoples. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Contemporary international political theory has surely confirmed John 
Rawls’s diagnosis that the eighth principle of his Law of Peoples ‘is especially 
controversial’ (Rawls 1999: 37 n. 43). This principle, which Rawls (1999: 84-85) 
valued highly (cf. Reidy 2007: 199-201), states that ‘[p]eoples have a duty to assist 
other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a 
just or decent political and social regime’ (Rawls 1999: 37). Whereas his earliest 
set of international principles matched international law’s core elements (Rawls 
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[1971] 1999: 331-335), ‘[t]he duty of assistance is Rawls’s greatest divergence 
from…today’s international law’ (Wenar 2017). This ‘progressive’ duty seems to 
require rich countries to address global poverty much more actively and 
financially support poor states far more generously than they have done so far 
(Beitz 2000: 672, 694; Neufeld 2011: 29; Wenar 2017).  
The controversy about Rawls’s duty has mostly involved various ‘non-
immediate’ issues: more indirect issues that affect the moral-theoretical 
framework underlying the duty and more outward ones that concern the duty’s 
practical value. The key indirect issue has concerned Rawls’s choice for a 
second, international original position of peoples separate from his first, 
domestic original position of individual persons, with an international duty of 
assistance as a result (Rawls 1999, [1971] 1999). ‘Cosmopolitans’ have insisted 
on a single persons-populated global original position and, consequently, a 
global, not just domestic, egalitarian principle of distributive justice as more 
Rawlsian-liberal in a politically-economically globalized world (Beitz [1979] 
1999; Pogge 1989, cf. 2004: 261; Moellendorf 2002). Rawls (1999: 82-83, 115-
120), however, has resolutely opposed this alteration of his theory, regarding a 
single global original position as basically intolerant towards non-liberal 
political collectivities - which, like liberal peoples, could (and, in case of ‘decent’ 
societies, do) have independent moral value - and the consequent, more radical 
principle of global (re)distribution as unjustly egalitarian. Moreover, other 
philosophers have defended the Rawlsian-ness of Rawls’s choice for a two-level 
original position structure and subsequent rejection of a global principle of 
distributive justice against the cosmopolitans by also pointing to the continued 
absence of a global cooperative society or global liberal-democratic people 
(Reidy 2004, 2007; Kamminga 2006; Martin 2015; cf. Opeskin 1996). Indeed, a 
so controversial, if not discredited, cosmopolitan original position would take us 
outside the Law of Peoples as a ‘realistically utopian’ Rawlsian theory (cf. 
Williams 2014). It offers insufficient reason for believing that Rawls’s duty of 
assistance may not be tenable. 
The more outward issues surrounding Rawls’s duty of assistance - with 
cosmopolitans and various others as Rawls-critics - have involved the sufficiency 
or demandingness as well as the feasibility and effectiveness of the duty in 
tackling global inequality, poverty, and climate change, the extent of societies’ 
self-responsibility, the fulfilment of human rights within societies, and the 
appropriateness of striving for societies’ political-cultural and institutional 
democratization (cf. Beitz 2000: 689-694; Armstrong 2009; Kenehan 2015; 
Brown 2015: 184-204; Maffettone 2017). Such debates make real sense only if it 
may be assumed that Rawls’s duty of assistance is somehow justifiable within 
his Law of Peoples itself. However, while Rawls, who made a decades-long 
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journey towards the duty of assistance, acknowledges that the duty’s nature is 
controversial and concedes that the basis for it is less firm than the other seven 
principles of his international theory (Neufeld 2011: 27), remarkably little 
scholarly attention has been given to this more immediate issue of the duty of 
assistance’s tenability within his Law of Peoples (though see Beitz 2000: 688-
689; Pogge 2004: 260-261; Williams 2011: 71-74, 81-89, 2014: 336-337). The 
cosmopolitan original position argument being dubious does not settle the 
matter, because that offers merely indirect support: it cannot say whether 
subsequent, more direct arguments for the duty of assistance are plausible. 
Thus, a fuller analysis of the internal-Rawlsian basis of the duty of assistance, 
more so than has been provided so far (as should become clearer below), is 
called for. 
In this article, my thesis is that Rawls’s duty of assistance principle is 
internally unsustainable, since it cannot be adequately justified from within his 
Law of Peoples. 1 Indeed, I suggest that the very addition of a duty of assistance 
has been a hasty, intuitive expression of Rawls’s desire to rescue the Law of 
Peoples as international translation of his domestic theory of justice by trying to 
pacify his early cosmopolitan critics who were surely right to identify the moral 
relevance of the enormous scale of global poverty (Beitz [1979] 1999; Pogge 
1994). 
I will develop a threefold argument for my thesis. First, Rawls’s own 
explanation of the duty of assistance within the Law of Peoples is unclear and 
confusing overall. Eager to show that his own theory thus does include a 
suitable response to global misery, Rawls’s prime concern seems to have been 
merely to safeguard his two-level political theory against cosmopolitan criticism. 
Second, the ‘Rawlsian’ ideal-theoretical and non-ideal-theoretical attempts of 
other philosophers to justify the duty of assistance have not been, and probably 
could not have been, successful. Third, Rawls’s Law of Peoples results into 
skepticism about the duty of assistance’s applicability to the non-ideal world. 
The article concludes that, instead of a duty of assistance, at most a principle of 
corrective justice in ideal theory combined with a right of assistance and an ad 
hoc duty of corrective justice in non-ideal theory is justifiable within the Law of 
Peoples. If my argument will be correct, those who share the intuition that some 
 
1 If successful, my argument would hold even more strongly against more egalitarian 
principles of justice defended on internal-Rawlsian grounds (cf. Pogge 1994; Moellendorf 2002: 
13) and applied globally. But such distributive principles seem implausible anyway: while the 
persons of Rawls’s domestic original position need economic cooperation to safeguard their basic 
interests, the (self-sufficient) peoples of his international original position do not (cf. Reidy 2007: 
211-212). 
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duty of foreign assistance exists in our world of massive poverty will have to 
seek elsewhere for a rational-theoretical underpinning. 
2. RAWLS’S OWN DEFECTIVE EXPLANATION OF THE DUTY OF 
ASSISTANCE 
My first argument is that Rawls’s own explicit explanation of the duty of 
assistance within the Law of Peoples is unclear and confusing overall. My 
reconstruction of the duty of assistance will suggest that protecting his two-level 
liberal theory against cosmopolitanism has mattered more to Rawls than 
showing the duty to be a natural implication of his Law of Peoples. 
In his 1993 article on the Law of Peoples, Rawls (1993: 46) does not include 
the duty of assistance as a principle of ideal theory, thus limiting his set of 
principles that should guide conduct among peoples to seven. Now the notion 
of ‘duties of assistance’ is already there (Rawls 1993: 47; cf. Rawls 1999: 38), and 
so is the claim that the representatives of decent (tolerable) peoples ‘care about 
the benefits of trade and assistance between peoples in time of need’ (1993: 53-
54; cf. 1999: 69). Yet Rawls (1993: 62-64) presents the duty of assistance only as 
part of non-ideal theory, stating that ‘the goal specified by non-ideal theory for 
the case of unfavorable conditions [is that] eventually each society now 
burdened by unfavorable conditions is to be raised to, or assisted towards, 
conditions that make a well-ordered society possible’ (Rawls 1993: 62). Against 
cosmopolitan critics, he defends peoples’ duty to assist: 
Even though no liberal principle of distributive justice would be adopted 
for dealing with unfavorable conditions, that certainly does not mean that 
the well-ordered and wealthier societies have no duties and obligations to 
societies burdened by such conditions. For the ideal conception of the 
society of peoples that well-ordered societies affirm directs that all societies 
are in due course to reach, or to be assisted to, the conditions that make a 
well-ordered society possible (Rawls 1993: 63, cf. 64 n. 51). 
However, while it is clear that, for Rawls, ‘the basis of the duty of assistance is 
not some liberal principle of distributive justice’, what remains less clear is why 
‘the ideal conception of the society of peoples itself as consisting of well-ordered 
societies’ (1993: 63) requires nothing less than a duty. Thus, in the 1993 version, 
the duty of assistance, apart from not being elevated to a Law of Peoples 
principle, is not given a satisfactory, direct explanation. 
 In his 1999, final version of the Law of Peoples, Rawls continues to treat 
the duty of assistance as the kind of non-ideal theory that tackles unfavorable 
conditions, stating early on: 
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[W]e must ask how far liberal or decent peoples owe a duty of assistance to 
[burdened] societies so that the latter may establish their own reasonably just or 
decent institutions. The aim of the Law of Peoples would be fully achieved when 
all societies have been able to establish either a liberal or a decent regime (Rawls 
1999: 5). 
Rawls now also introduces the duty of assistance as ideal theory’s eighth 
principle. To requote: ‘Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under 
unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and 
social regime’ (Rawls 1999: 37). 
 However, Rawls’s new, remarkable principle is confusing, if not worse, 
because it suggests that ‘peoples’ can be burdened (although the word 
‘burdened’ is not included) and should then be assisted (cf. 1999: 85), whereas 
his overall international theory holds peoples to have just or decent regimes and 
be non-burdened. In fact, Rawls (1999: 37 n. 43, 43, 105-120) again chooses to 
discuss the duty of assistance mostly in the part on non-ideal theory, as he 
emphasizes that ‘the “duty of assistance” applies only to the duty that liberal 
and decent peoples have to assist burdened societies’ (Rawls 1999: 43 n. 53, 
emphasis in original). 2 Now in mentioning ‘peoples’ rather than ‘societies’ in his 
eighth principle Rawls probably means what he writes, even if confusingly so, 
because he is discussing ideal theory. Yet, while it is natural to think that 
Rawlsian peoples should assist one another in need (Pogge 2004: 260) and will 
accept provisions for this (Rawls 1999: 38), it remains odd to phrase this in 
terms of a duty of assistance, when that duty is primarily meant towards 
burdened societies. 
 Rawls reintroduces the duty of assistance in his ideal-theoretical 
treatment of ‘cooperative organizations’. First he explains these organizations, 
which include only (liberal or decent) peoples (Rawls 1999: 25), by stating that 
the peoples-representing ‘parties will formulate [additional] guidelines for 
setting up cooperative organizations and agree to standards of fairness for trade 
as well as certain provisions for mutual assistance’ (Rawls 1999: 42, cf. 115). 
Next he postulates three such organizations: one directed at fair trade, another 
occupied with cooperative banking, and a third to safeguard global peace and 
security (Rawls 1999: 42). Then Rawls defends the ‘corrective’ role of the duty 
of assistance for these ideal organizations, notably fair trade ones: ‘Should these 
organizations have unjustified distributive effects between peoples, these would 
have to be corrected, and taken into account by the duty of assistance’ (1999: 43, 
cf. 115 and 19, 36, 38, 41, 46, 84, 86, cf. 70, 112-113). 
 
2 To speak of Rawlsian ‘burdened peoples’ as some theorists do (e.g., Wenar 2017), is to 
employ a misnomer never used by Rawls himself yet one for which he is somewhat to blame. 
368         MENNO R. KAMMINGA 
 
 However, Rawls’s use of the duty of assistance as a principle for 
cooperative organizations of peoples is confusing besides presumably 
intentional again. It seems intentional, for if he felt that the duty applied to 
burdened societies only, he would not explicitly rely on it for the purpose of 
compensating disadvantaged peoples in case of ‘unjustified distributive effects’ 
from cooperation (Rawls 1999: 43, 115). Apparently, what Rawls (1999: 43) holds 
is that ‘all well-ordered peoples must refrain from acting, whether individually 
or through their voluntary associations, in ways certainly or likely to disable any 
people from…remaining well-ordered’ (Reidy 2004: 314). Nevertheless, for two 
reasons at least, it remains puzzling why Rawls (1999: 43) invokes the duty of 
assistance in this context. 
 First, it is unclear why, as Rawls suggests, ‘correction’ should occur only 
when cooperation results in peoples facing the threat of relapsing into 
burdened-ness. Apparently, only such effects could count as ‘unjustified’, since 
invoking the duty of assistance would make no sense if this is not what Rawls 
means. Yet it is not obvious why less undesirable effects of cooperation would 
need no correction. Indeed, Rawls fails to clarify the baseline for indicating 
‘unjustified distributive effects’ (Beitz 2005: 21 n. 21; Pogge 2004: 282). 
 Second, more seriously still, Rawls here mixes up the duty of assistance 
with a duty of corrective justice. Not only are these two very different principles, 
but also is the latter more appropriate here, and within ideal theory more 
generally, than the former, which could probably better have been saved (if at 
all) for non-ideal theory only (like in the 1993 account). Thus, Rawls overloads 
his duty of assistance by including ‘correction’ besides ‘assistance’. Whereas the 
duty of assistance seems a ‘positive’ duty (helping others because of their being 
in independent need) and is clearly understood this way by Rawls (1993, 1999) 
elsewhere in the Law of Peoples, corrective justice is ‘negative’ duty-generated 
for assuming a relationship in need of rectification for harm done (cf. Opeskin 
1996; Pogge 2004). While Rawls conflates the two as applied here, he nowhere 
defends the duty of assistance in terms of rectification. Obviously, he does not 
wish to restrict the scope of the duty of assistance to the Society of Peoples with 
its organizations, since then it could have no relevance for conduct towards 
‘outside’ societies. 
 In the part on non-ideal theory, Rawls fleshes out his duty of assistance, 
but treating it, as earlier, as a duty owed to burdened societies only: 
Burdened societies…lack the political and cultural traditions, the human capital 
and know-how, and, often, the material and technological resources needed to be 
well-ordered. The long-term goal of (relatively) well-ordered societies should be to 
bring burdened societies, like outlaw states, into the Society of well-ordered 
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Peoples. Well-ordered peoples have a duty to assist burdened societies…Only 
burdened societies need help (Rawls 1999: 106, emphasis in original). 
The duty of assistance, Rawls holds, has three guidelines. First, since a well-
ordered society need not be wealthy (Rawls 1999: 106), analogous to the 
domestic ‘duty of just savings’, 
the aim is to realize and preserve just (or decent) institutions, and not 
simply to increase, much less to maximize indefinitely, the average level of 
wealth, or the wealth of any society or any particular class in society. In 
these respects the duty of assistance and the duty of just savings express 
the same underlying idea (Rawls 1999: 107) 
Second, whereas well-orderedness depends on political culture rather than 
natural factors, ‘there is no recipe, certainly no easy recipe, for well-ordered 
peoples to help a burdened society to change its political and social culture’ 
(Rawls 1999: 108). The difference is made by virtues such as probity, 
industriousness, innovativeness, cooperative talents, and also by controlled 
population policy, attentiveness to human rights, and creation of gender 
equality (Rawls 1999: 108-111). 3 Thus, ‘throwing funds’ will not work (Rawls 
1999: 110). 
 Third, ‘its aim [being] to help burdened societies to be able to manage 
their own affairs reasonably and rationally and eventually to become members 
of the Society of well-ordered Peoples’ (Rawls 1999: 111, cf. 111-115), as a 
principle of ‘transition’ like the just savings duty the duty of assistance has a 
‘target’ and a ‘cutoff point’ - much more obviously so than cosmopolitan 
principles of egalitarian distributive justice (Rawls 1999: 106, 117-120): 
The…duty of assistance…is a principle of transition, [like] the principle of 
real saving over time in domestic society…[R]eal saving is meant to lay the 
foundation for a just basic structure of society, at which point it may cease. 
In the society of the Law of Peoples the duty of assistance holds until all 
societies have achieved just liberal or decent basic institutions. Both the 
duty of real saving and the duty of assistance are defined by a target 
beyond which they no longer hold…[The latter] has also...a cutoff point, 
since for each burdened society the principle ceases to apply once the 
target is reached (Rawls 1999: 118-119, emphases in original). 
However, Rawls again fails to offer an adequately immediate explanation for 
his duty of assistance. Certainly, his three guidelines, which indicate the 
 
3 While Rawls’s duty of assistance’s second guideline defends the promotion of human rights 
(Rawls 1999: 108-111, cf. 48 n. 59), Martin (2015: 745-746) seems wrong to think that a separate 
Rawlsian duty to fulfill the right to subsistence in burdened societies exists. 
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analogy with the duty of just savings and specify the aim of assistance, the 
importance of political culture, and the focus and limits of assistance, do much 
to demarcate it. Yet, not only do these guidelines not clearly explain the duty of 
assistance as a duty, but also do they seem to function primarily to make the 
duty of assistance more realistic and acceptable than cosmopolitan egalitarian 
justice. Thus, Rawls explains the duty of assistance in a ‘relative’, thus non-
direct, sense at best. 
Still, Rawls’s only explanation of the duty of assistance that could count as an 
attempt at justification - and perhaps added in 1999 for that reason - is the duty 
of just savings analogy (Rawls 1999: 106-107): as we saw, the two duties 
supposedly share ‘the same underlying idea’. However, the analogy between 
‘intergenerational’ just savings and ‘international’ assistance is strained on 
Rawls’s own terms, because in domestic society - which is the object of a ‘proper 
patriotism’ (Rawls 1999: 44, 62, 111-112) - the duty operates within a people 
including their own descendants (their children, with whom the present 
generation is directly connected), whereas internationally it would apply 
between groups of ‘strangers’ who each are self-responsible in principle (against 
Williams 2011: 84-85, cf. 86-88). Rather, this more intuitive justification, while 
not strong enough to sustain an international duty as such, is merely sufficient 
for the duty of assistance to have a cutoff point, like the duty of just savings.  
Overall, Rawls’s presentation of the duty of assistance betrays insecurity 
about the duty’s adequacy. Rather than providing an ‘argument for the duty of 
assistance analogous to the argument for a distributive principle in domestic 
society’ (Beitz 2000: 689),4 Rawls tries to protect his originally domestic theory 
against cosmopolitan reformulations by explaining the sensibleness of his 
peoples’ duty against cosmopolitan justice. 
3. THE FAILURE OF OTHERS’ ‘RAWLSIAN’ ATTEMPTS TO JUSTIFY 
THE DUTY OF ASSISTANCE  
Having argued that Rawls’s eventual choice to include the duty of assistance 
in his list of international principles is troubling, I now turn to the ‘Rawlsian’ 
ideal-theoretical and non-ideal-theoretical efforts of other philosophers to justify 
this duty. However, second, I argue that these attempts fail, and probably 
inevitably so. I start with non-ideal theory. 
 
4 As Beitz adds, ‘there is no suggestion, for example, that the international distribution of 
natural resources is unfair or that the circumstances of an individual’s birth…are in any ethically 
significant sense arbitrary’ (2000: 689). 
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Rawls-adherents David Reidy (2004: 314 n. 10, 2007: 195 n. 3, 231) and Rex 
Martin (2015: 748-749) have argued that Rawls’s non-ideal theory needs a 
principle of corrective, or rectificatory, justice for addressing historical injustices 
such as (the legacy of) colonialism or imperialism. In his attempt to defend 
Rawls, Reidy (2007: 198-199) has even suggested that the duty of assistance 
could be justified as a duty of corrective justice in the real world of today. Note 
that, by itself, Rawls’s own belief that wealth and poverty are mainly 
determined by internal-cultural factors (Rawls 1999: 108, 117) offers insufficient 
ground for averting Reidy’s and Martin’s claims. This non-ideal theory 
underlying, empirical dispute - the effects of colonialism or imperialism as 
opposed to the role of political culture - cannot be settled by simply siding with 
Rawls, who nowhere mentions any need for corrective justice between peoples 
and burdened societies as rectification of past wrongs. 
Yet the above line of reasoning cannot save Rawls’s duty of assistance due to 
conceptual and empirical problems. Obviously, this attempt would not solve the 
problem identified earlier regarding ideal-theoretical cooperative organizations 
among peoples, but one could also not plausibly defend the duty of assistance 
as based on a principle of rectificatory justice in non-ideal theory. First, the 
mixing up of negative and positive duties as noted in the previous section would 
then simply be extended beyond ideal theory to non-ideal theory. Second, 
corrective justice is a particular, case-by-case principle that is extremely hard to 
apply and does not fit the Law of Peoples’s universal aim (Rawls 1999: 85-86, 
121-122). As Brian Opeskin (1996: 22, 26-28) points out, corrective justice is 
merely applicable in defined circumstances and therefore no general solution 
for poor countries, since plausible claims for corrective justice require the wrong 
to be recent and the injury to be reliably quantifiable. Various difficulties exist, 
such as the reliance on a - highly speculative and hardly objective - counter-
historical assessment of colonized societies’ non-colonial developmental paths 
in order to establish the harm done, the absence of a clear causal relationship 
between being colonized and being (relatively) poor, and the uncomfortable 
finding that colonization often also conferred educational, economic, 
technological, legal, and infrastructural benefits on the local population 
(Opeskin 1996: 34-35). And third, since corrective justice merely requires 
rectifying past wrongs, peoples responsible for colonialism or imperialism could 
compensate the - adequately quantified - harm done by making a single full 
payment, or perhaps a few partial payments, to the burdened societies affected, 
irrespective of whether or not this helps to establish these societies’ well-
orderedness. Thus, Reidy and Martin seem right only to the extent that a 
colonialism- or imperialism-based duty of corrective justice may be of 
supplementary value. Since the duty of assistance must be kept apart from 
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corrective justice, conceptually and probably also empirically (cf. Martin 2015: 
749; against Williams 2011: 78, 139-140, 154), a separate justification for it 
remains necessary. The above sympathetic critique cannot support Rawls’s own 
duty and is of casual non-ideal-theoretical value at best. 
Ideal-theoretically, the basic problem is whether peoples could have duties to 
societies not represented in the international original position. Now, as Pietro 
Maffettone notes, the recent literature about what could justify the duty of 
assistance regards it as ‘the result of an assurance problem based on the 
possibility that a well-ordered people might become a burdened society through 
no fault of its own’ (2017: 355 n. 3; cf. Reidy 2007; Williams 2011; Kenehan 2013: 
316-317). This way, the duty of assistance principle would protect peoples from 
relapsing into burdened societies. Thus, Reidy defends the duty of assistance as 
ideal theory-based and non-ideal theory-extended: 
It would be rational for agents [representing well-ordered peoples in an 
international original position] to agree to a mutual insurance policy 
guaranteeing coverage to any burdened society so long as there is no clear 
and compelling historical evidence of its political responsibility for self-
inflicted wounds. If this is right, then Rawls’s duty of assistance…has a 
sound justification within ideal theory and is naturally extended to the 
conditions of nonideal theory with just the implications Rawls suggests: 
well-ordered peoples today owe aid and assistance to most, if not all, 
presently burdened societies (Reidy 2007: 198-199, emphasis added). 
Huw Lloyd Williams offers a justification comparable to, yet more basic 
than, Reidy’s: 
[B]urdened societies are regarded as exempt from the international 
original position given their reduced capability, but their interests are 
nevertheless served by representatives of other peoples who know they 
might befall the same fate, and are concerned to include provisions for 
mutual assistance. The fact that burdened societies are not party to the 
original agreement does not seem to me to be good grounds on which to 
deny that a duty of justice applies to them (Williams 2011: 88, emphasis 
added). 
However, the ‘assurance problem’ solution fails due to various reasons. First, 
Rawls himself does not claim his duty of assistance to be something like an 
‘assurance problem’, which is expectable actually since the duty of assistance is 
a duty to help already burdened societies and the ideal-theoretical eighth 
principle a later addition (1999) to an earlier, essentially non-ideal-theoretical 
account (1993). Second, as Williams acknowledges, ‘there seems to be a 
qualitative difference between…a duty of mutual assurance between well-
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ordered peoples, and a duty of assistance’ to (historically) burdened societies 
that could not have demanded equal respect or developed a full moral identity 
(2011: 73, cf. 83). Third, Reidy’s condition of a burdened society having ‘no 
clear and compelling historical evidence of its political responsibility for self-
inflicted wounds’ violates Rawls’s own view that the duty of assistance applies 
just as well to self-caused burdened societies (Armstrong 2009: 469) and 
suggests a corrective justice justification already rejected above. And fourth, 
Williams’s argument may work as an empathy-based plea for assistance to 
burdened societies but not as a defense of a duty to do so - let alone one of 
justice. After all, that ‘peoples…might befall the same fate’ as burdened societies 
(say, ‘as the result of a natural catastrophe’; Maffettone 2017: 355 n. 2) is 
extremely unlikely or hardly possible within the context of Rawls’s ideal theory, 
also because peoples can typically rely on each other for provisions and support 
(cf. Rawls 1999: 37-38). Moreover, this argument suggests, rather perversely, that 
the higher peoples’ chances of falling into burdened-ness are, the stronger their 
duty of assistance becomes.5 Thus, we are dealing with flawed attempts to 
support Rawls’s duty. 
Now Williams (2014: 336-337) also argues that, on Rawls’s view, burdened 
societies are to be seen as future members of the Society of Peoples, so that their 
interests are still represented equally and these societies treated in the spirit of 
equality, and that, therefore, the duty of assistance is a duty - again even a 
strong one of justice rather than a weak, humanitarian one. However, this 
argument of Williams’s is at worst question-begging for presuming a duty of 
assistance - so that equal representation is guaranteed - and at best in line with 
Rawls’s emphasis on the ‘aim’ of assistance, of which it is questionable, as 
suggested in the previous section, whether this as such is sufficient for 
establishing a straightforward duty, let alone one of justice. In fact, Rawls 
reformulates the ‘aim’, which is ‘to help burdened societies to be able to manage 
their own affairs reasonably and rationally and eventually to become members 
of the Society of well-ordered Peoples’ as defining the ‘target’ of assistance 
(1999: 111, cf. 106-107); the ‘aim’, then, is not the ‘duty’s’ basic justification but 
merely its ‘third guideline’, defining its ‘target’. Overall, Williams (2011: 81-89) 
overstretches Rawls’s view by arguing that the duty of assistance is a duty of 
justice (grounded in a global cross-original position ‘hidden’ equal treatment) 
 
5 Williams draws a flawed analogy: ‘Individuals with temporary health problems are regarded 
as exempt from the original position given their reduced capability, but their interests are 
nevertheless represented there by rational choosers, who know they might befall the same fate 
and so are concerned to include the provision of health care in the social minimum’ (2011: 88). 
In this case, it seems more plausible to believe that healthy ‘rational choosers’ will care for 
provisions and are rather equal in this respect: sooner or later, they all may well, even suddenly, 
‘befall the same fate’ as the unhealthy. 
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without firstly demonstrating that there is a Rawlsian duty at all for peoples to 
help societies outside the international original position. 
Why, then, do such ideal theory defense attempts seem bound to fail? Within 
Rawls’s framework, peoples should be reasonable towards other peoples as 
fellow partners in the international position. However, it is just not obvious why 
they should also be reasonable, let alone equally so, to burdened societies as 
non-peoples. Thus, early Rawls-critic Thomas Pogge explains the ideal-
theoretical problem for justifying the duty of assistance by a plain, Rawlsian 
reciprocity-emphasizing argument - remarkably, one virtually ignored by 
Rawls’s defenders: 
It is doubtful that the [newly added duty] would be adopted in Rawls’ 
international original position, which represents liberal and decent peoples 
only. Each such representative is rational and seeking an international 
order that enables his or her own people to be stably organized according 
to its own conception of justice or decency. Such representatives may well 
agree to assist one another in times of need. But why is it rational for them 
to commit to assisting poor peoples that never had a liberal or decent 
institutional order?...[P]eoples neither liberal nor decent are not 
represented in the international original position, and the interests of their 
members are thereby discounted completely (Pogge 2004: 260-261).6 
Darrell Moellendorf puts the point as follows: ‘The selection of the duty of 
assistance in this original position is beset with interpretive difficulties. If the 
parties assume strict compliance, it is unclear why they would select a duty of 
assistance’ (2014: 227). The Pogge-Moellendorf critique is as strong as it is 
simple, even if we consider that peoples with their shared goals are reasonable 
as well as rational (cf. Rawls 1999: 35, and that Pogge and Moellendorf actually 
want Rawls to accept the cosmopolitan original position already disputed in the 
introduction). 
Noting that Rawls himself does not understand the duty of assistance as 
grounded in either beneficence or distributive justice (Beitz 2005: 21; cf. Brown 
215: 196), Charles Beitz, another early critic, suggests that this duty could have a 
more prudential justification at best: 
The force of the duty of assistance seems to arise…from the importance 
for liberal societies of enlarging the Society of Peoples to include, 
eventually, all the societies of the world. For example, [within the 
constraints imposed by Rawls’s theory] it might be argued that the chances 
 
6 Pogge adds that this is also problematic for ‘forceful intervention’ in outlaw states (2004: 
280-281), since outlaw states, like burdened societies, are not parties in Rawls’s international 
original position. 
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of peace would be greater in a world in which all societies had been lifted 
out of burdening conditions (Beitz 2000: 688-689). 
But, as Beitz (2000: 689) adds, since any security threat coming from 
burdened societies will not be that serious, defending the duty of assistance this 
way would not be very convincing.7 Therefore, it is conceivable to see 
‘assistance’ as a Rawlsian obligation of charity at best, as Allen Buchanan (2000: 
710), yet another early Rawls-critic, suggests. As Buchanan explains: ‘There is 
no indication that this duty of aid is to be understood as the collective 
responsibility of the society of peoples and no mention of a right on the part of 
‘‘burdened societies’’ to receive it’ (2000: 710, cf. 715) - societies that, for Rawls, 
remain responsible for their own predicaments (cf. Armstrong 2009: 466-470). 
Indeed, since the mere aim of globalizing the Society of well-ordered Peoples 
cannot turn ‘assistance’ into a moral ‘duty’, and a defense of the duty of 
assistance in terms of prudence is dubious empirically - but also weak morally - 
assistance seems best understood as a measure of charity, or supererogatory act 
(praiseworthy but not mandatory). If so, peoples retain the right to provide 
assistance. 
In short, the discussed attempts to justify the duty of assistance are, and most 
likely cannot be but, unduly strained. Like Rawls himself, the Rawlsians 
involved fail to somehow defend the duty of assistance parallel to Rawls’s 
defense of domestic distributive justice. Perhaps a satisfactory defense does 
appear possible one day, but surely the prospect looks dim. But there is still a 
third issue to consider. 
4. RAWLSIAN SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE DUTY OF ASSISTANCE IN 
THE NON-IDEAL WORLD 
Third, I argue that Rawls’s Law of Peoples leads to skepticism about the duty 
of assistance’s applicability to the non-ideal world. Pivotal to this - presumably 
surprising - argument is Rawls’s introduction of non-ideal theory: 
On the assumption that there exist in the world some relatively well-
ordered peoples, we ask in nonideal theory how these peoples should act 
toward non-well-ordered peoples. We take as a basic characteristic of well-
 
7 Rawls (1999: 112-113) himself suggests that well-ordered peoples seek a world in which all 
societies have well-ordered - thus not dangerous but peaceful and cooperative - regimes, and so 
support a duty of assistance, at least initially, out of self-interest; over time, affinity, mutual 
concern, and cooperativeness among peoples may become stronger and moral considerations-
based. But, apart from lacking in empirical convincingness, this motivational argument does not 
make the ‘duty’ of assistance itself any more moral. 
376         MENNO R. KAMMINGA 
 
ordered peoples that they wish to live in a world in which all peoples accept 
and follow the…Law of Peoples (Rawls 1999: 89). 
Rawls makes two claims here. First, peoples naturally want other state-level 
collectivities to come to behave as well-ordered peoples. 8 Second, insofar as 
necessary, it is up to existing ‘relatively well-ordered peoples’ to make this 
happen. As I will explain, both claims, particularly the second, are troubling, 
especially in case of the duty of assistance, which, recall, is explicated thus: ‘The 
long-term goal of (relatively) well-ordered societies should be to bring burdened 
societies…into the Society of well-ordered Peoples. Well-ordered peoples have a 
duty to assist burdened societies’ (Rawls 1999: 106, emphasis in original). 
 There is, I argue, a double flaw in the bridge between ideal and non-
ideal theory that applies to non-ideal theory in general but to the present kind 
in particular. First, Rawls’s ‘relatively well-ordered peoples’ notion is shaky. 
Rawls never clarifies ‘relatively’, in terms of content, stage, and sufficiency 
(without completeness being required) for assuming duties towards others. He 
never explains when actual ‘peoples’ qualify as ‘relatively well-ordered’, so that 
they may be expected to conduct a moral foreign policy, including a duty of 
assistance. And he never defends the duty of assistance’s immediate and full, 
rather than gradual, force from the tipping-points of ‘relativeness’ and ‘people-
ness’. Actually, it is hard to see how a wholly satisfactory defense could have 
been provided in this respect. 
 Second, Rawls’s duty of assistance is unstable, if not worse, for being 
dependent on ‘people-ness’ as such. Rawls (1999: 17, 23-30, 34-35, cf. 46-48) 
bases his theory on ‘peoples’ with their reasonable-moral motives (peace, 
mutual equal respect, human rights), because he sees ‘states’ as merely 
rationally pursuing power and self-interest. However, Rawls’s international law 
characteristically cannot be relevant to state actors external to the Society of 
Peoples, since he assumes that, as long as state-level collectivities have not 
become peoples, they cannot have acquired moral foreign policy duties. But 
how could we ascertain that peoples exist, or will always exist (even if merely 
‘relatively’), in our non-ideal world? What if (many) so-called liberal collectivities 
should be considered outlaw states for having violated the human rights of 
outsiders? Indeed, ‘the idealized counterfactual features attributed to 
hypothetical liberal peoples…may not reflect the characteristics of actual liberal 
peoples’ (Kang 2016: 46-48, quotation 47), and the same goes for ‘decent 
peoples’. Could the wish to avoid foreign duties not be a (internally conceivable) 
 
8 In referring to ‘non-well-ordered peoples’ Rawls is inaccurate again, since in his theory 
peoples are well-ordered by definition. Yet here we should assume that he has all human state-
level collectivities other than ‘peoples’ in mind, notably ‘benevolent absolutisms’, ‘outlaw states’, 
and ‘burdened societies’. 
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reason for rationally self-interested collectivities to not become peoples? Is 
‘relativeness’ not actually an ad hoc concession to make things easier in this 
regard? Thus, with only well-ordered peoples having a duty of assistance, the 
duty is jeopardized in a world of amoral, if not immoral, states. 
 Rawls’s theory, then, betrays a realist tendency towards international 
skepticism (against Beitz 2000: 696): it must accept that the non-ideal world may 
have states as its major actors, and allow for the serious possibility that even 
‘relatively well-ordered peoples’ do not, or hardly, exist. If a limited number of 
such peoples do exist, these may not be wealthy enough (together) to provide 
meaningful assistance to an indefinite number of burdened societies. Insofar as, 
now or in the future, global politics is dominated by states that do not or no 
longer qualify as Rawlsian peoples, it would include no real Rawlsian 
international duties and thus no duty of assistance (Kamminga 2015). In the 
non-ideal world, peoples could lose their well-orderedness by being unable to 
prevent falling back into burdened societies themselves and thus to assist other 
such societies. Or they could become outlaw states, thus could choose to lose 
their well-orderedness and their duties of assistance, possibly even while 
remaining rich. 
 Now Rawls (1999: 101, 43 n. 53) does suggest that the countries of North 
America and Europe qualify as liberal-democratic peoples. 9 Yet, as Beitz notes, 
it is questionable ‘whether the requisite common sympathies and moral nature 
can be found in culturally diverse societies like those of the United States or 
Belgium, to say nothing of India or the Philippines’ (2000: 680). In fact, it 
appears difficult for ‘liberal’ collectivities to meet, and certainly to uphold, the 
three Rawlsian criteria for peoplehood (even if only ‘relatively’): ‘a reasonably 
just constitutional democratic government that serves their fundamental 
interests; citizens united by…“common sympathies”; and…a moral nature [in 
being both reasonable and rational]’ (Rawls 1999: 23, cf. 23-25). One typical 
danger, as Rawls himself notes, is that the democracy or moral character of 
American and European peoples becomes undermined by capitalism and 
consumerism.10 Also, the United States may have lost much of its democratic 
 
9 Perhaps Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bhutan, Singapore, 
Samoa, and Brunei could qualify as decent peoples. But these countries together have very little 
global impact (Brown 2015: 74). 
10 Rawls once wrote about the European Union in relation to the United States: ‘Isn’t there a 
conflict between a large free and open market comprising all of Europe and the individual 
nation-states, each with its separate political and social institutions, historical memories, and 
forms and traditions of social policy[?] Surely these are great value to the citizens of these 
countries and give meaning to their life. The large open market including all of Europe is aim of 
the large banks and the capitalist business class whose main goal is simply larger profit. The idea 
of economic growth,…with no specific end in sight, fits this class perfectly. If they speak about 
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character for violating Rawls’s criterion of democracy of being ‘not directed by 
the interests of large concentrations of private economic and corporate power 
veiled from public knowledge and almost entirely free from accountability’ 
(Rawls 1999: 24). 11 And Rawls’s remark that a people could decide to go to war 
for economic profit or expansion or power and influence (Rawls 1999: 91) 
brings the American 2003 Iraq war to mind.12 Or, as Pogge (2004: 282; 2006: 
223, cf. 221) argues, it is highly questionable to what extent rich Western 
countries may qualify as (liberal) peoples rather than being outlaw states for 
having violated the global poor’s human rights. Even if we reject Pogge’s stress 
on the West-imposed world order as a systematic cause of world poverty, we 
should still allow for the possibility - and this is sufficient here - that this order is 
occasionally involved in global poverty. Surely this is a relevant empirical issue 
that Rawls as a political philosopher cannot evade. 
 To recapitulate, the problem of Rawls’s (unintended) eventual 
international skepticism with the resulting shakiness of the duty of assistance is 
twofold. First, Rawls problematically assumes collectivities to have moral duties 
only if and once they have become relatively well-ordered; these duties, then, 
lack independent moral status. Second, the more it has to be stressed, in line 
with Rawls’s overall perspective, that the ideal ought not to be confused with 
the real world, the greater the gap between ideal theory and non-ideal theory 
becomes. From some point, ideal theory cannot be plausibly used as a 
benchmark anymore: applying peoplehood to the non-ideal world will then start 
to have absurd implications. As Chris Brown notes, under non-ideal conditions, 
‘we are really interested in the rights of states since states actually exist whether 
they are [peoples] or not…and so find ourselves trying to translate “peoples” into 
states’, but at some point the ‘translation’ breaks down (2015: 73). 13 And if we 
must conclude that no sufficiently well-ordered peoples exist, we must 
acknowledge that there are no duties of assistance either. Since this is possible, 
and also that there may be rationally self-interested collectivities that refuse to 
 
distribution, it is [al]most always in terms of trickle down. The long-term result of this - which we 
already have in the United States - is a civil society awash in a meaningless consumerism of some 
kind’ (Rawls and Van Parijs 2003). 
11 As Rawls asks: ‘When politicians are beholden to their constituents for essential campaign 
funds, and a very unequal distribution of wealth obtains in the background culture, with the 
great wealth being in the control of corporate economic power, is it any wonder that 
congressional legislation is, in effect, written by lobbyists, and Congress becomes a bargaining 
chamber in which laws are bought and sold?’ (1999: 24 n. 19). 
12 Rawls admits that ‘so-called liberal societies…may act wrongly’ (1999: 91 n. 3). 
13 Arguably, liberal collectivities will always qualify as well-ordered peoples for meeting the 
requirements for decent peoples (cf. Rawls 1999: 63). Yet as a solution for the present problem, 
its absurd implication would be that Rawls needs the non-liberal category of decent peoples to 
save his liberal international theory. 
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become peoples and then take on moral duties to outsiders, the duty of 
assistance, and thus the fate of burdened societies unable to become well-
ordered on their own, will be blocked by an ‘unlucky’ real world situation. 
Certainly, for Rawls, collectivities should become and remain liberal or decent, 
but if they are not or do not wish to, they effectively, and troublingly, have no 
duty to assist burdened societies. 
 In short, a serious line of skepticism regarding the non-ideal world 
applicability and stability of the duty of assistance exists within Rawls’s Law of 
Peoples itself. While the other kind of non-ideal theory - just war doctrine - is 
also affected by the above analysis, the critique is less worrying in that case. 
While Rawls defends a ‘duty of assistance’, he justifies merely a ‘right to war’, 
that is, a right for peoples to defend themselves or to intervene in outlaw states 
to protect human rights (Rawls 1999: 89-94). Indeed, Rawls plausibly suggests 
that Michael Walzer’s philosophically less abstracting Just and Unjust Wars 
[1977], as an ‘impressive work’ from which he does not ‘depart…in any 
significant respect’ (1999: 95, cf. 98), could have done that latter job at least as 
well. Not surprisingly, the Law of Peoples’ list of principles (Rawls 1999: 37) 
does not even include a right, let alone a duty, to intervention. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Altogether, Rawls’s duty of assistance is a non-starter. His Law of Peoples, its 
prominent status in the debate on global justice notwithstanding, cannot 
successfully uphold its duty to assist deprived countries, undeveloped and 
unstable as that is. Considering Rawls’s confused treatment of ‘correction’ 
among cooperating peoples as falling within the scope of the duty of assistance, 
the most ideal theory could support is a principle of corrective justice among 
well-ordered peoples. In non-ideal theory, Rawls may well uphold a mere ‘right 
of assistance’ besides a modest, casual corrective justice duty. From his 
perspective, it seems reasonable to hold that peoples, even if hard to identify in 
the non-ideal world, may well try to universalize the Law of Peoples and so to 
provide assistance to burdened societies, if assistance is not carried out 
‘paternalistically’ (Rawls 1999: 111). This way, burdened societies remain 
intended future members of the Society of Peoples. As with the ‘right to 
intervention’, the Society of Peoples’s aim justifies only this. Adopting these 
moral notions would not offset but still soften an abandonment of the duty of 
assistance as Rawls’s key addition to contemporary international law. 
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